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INTRODUCTION
Landowners impacted by flooding have been emboldened to
pursue inverse condemnation actions by recent Supreme Court
precedent, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States,'
which held that temporary inundation could constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking. 2 In one piece of pending litigation, over four
hundred landowners and two American Indian tribes with property
in seven states have sued the United States for takings from losses
caused by flooding on the Missouri River. 3 In 2011, unprecedented
precipitation and snowmelt caused extensive damage to thousands
of acres of floodplain land.4 Floodwater not only carved fifty-foot
deep gouges in the land but also created sand dunes up to fifteen
feet high, some of which are still present to this day.5 Unable to sue
the atmosphere itself, or the Creator of the snowpack and rainfall,
the landowners sued the United States, claiming that the
government managed its flood control structures in a manner that
failed to protect the landowners' downstream properties.
Looking downstream to a different lawsuit, New Orleans
landowners successfully raised takings claims against the United
States for constructing and operating a navigational channel that
acted as a hurricane "superhighway" for Gulf Coast storms.6 There,
the landowners amassed evidence that the channel magnified storm
* Robert B. Daugherty Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law.
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organizers and participants of the Vermont Law School's Colloquium on
Environmental Scholarship for their feedback, especially John Echeverria, and
research assistants Kathleen Miller, Anthony Aerts, and Sydney Aase.
1. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
2. Id. at 522.
3. Complaint at 1-5, 7, Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-
00183-NBF (Fed. Cl. Mar. 5, 2014). The 2011 flood also provoked takings
claims from Mississippi River floodplain owners. Quebedeaux v. United States,
112 Fed. Cl. 317, 319-20 (2013).
4. Josh Funk, Landowners File Lawsuit over Missouri River Floods, SAINT
Louis POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local
/landowners-file-lawsuit-over-missouri-river-floods/article_91bcc5f4-fb49-55a1
-acel-38fe25570293.html.
5. Id.
6. Saint Bernard Par. Gov't v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707, 713, 732
(2016).
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surges and directed floodwaters onto the properties of "at least"
thirty thousand adversely affected property owners.7
Flood-related takings issues warrant heightened attention from
both a legal and physical standpoint. Populations are rapidly
growing in floodplains and coastal areas, while climate change and
rising sea levels are placing even more pressure on every level of
government to protect those populations.8  At the same time,
Arkansas Game & Fish and its progeny produce a chilling effect,
making officials less likely to restrict improvident floodplain and
coastal development for fear of takings claims. 9 These cases may
also inhibit governments' willingness to engage in ecological
restoration projects or to construct, retrofit, or operate dams, levees,
and other types of flood control structures for any purpose other
than flood control, such as environmental quality, recreation, or
wildlife habitat. 10
Legally, perhaps more than any other type of physical
occupation, flood cases raise a slough of critical issues regarding the
management of vulnerable properties and compensation for
government actions that affect those properties. Unpacking these
issues necessarily requires a deep assessment of the interrelated
concepts of torts, takings, and property rights.
The fundamental jurisdictional issue to be resolved in flood-
related cases is whether a plaintiffs claims should be characterized
as a tort, such as negligence, or an appropriation under the Fifth
Amendment. If the claims are the former, they cannot be brought in
the Court of Federal Claims ("Claims Court"), which is a court of
limited jurisdiction.1 1 Also, if the claims sound in torts rather than
takings, federal immunity may require dismissal regardless of the
venue. 12 On remand, Arkansas Game & Fish blurred the line
between the two characterizations to such an extent that the
7. Id. at 734, 736.
8. Sarah Childress & Katie Worth, How Federal Flood Maps Ignore the
Risks of Climate Change, FRONTLINE (May 26, 2016), http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/frontline/article/how-federal-flood-maps-ignore-the-risks-of-climate
-change/.
9. See Robert Haskell Abrams & Jacqueline Bertelsen, Downstream
Inundations Caused by Federal Flood Control Dam Operations in a Changing
Climate: Getting the Proper Mix of Takings, Tort, and Compensation, 19 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (observing that Arkansas Game & Fish will
encourage litigation by flood-affected landowners).
10. See id.; James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of
Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 93 (2016) (noting that broadening
rights to compensation "undoubtedly instill[s] fear in many would-be
regulators").
11. Pierce v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 798, 800 (2014).
12. Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012); Sanguinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924).
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distinction is now virtually unrecognizable. 13 A relatively clear
demarcation based on the government's intent or substantial
certainty that plaintiffs property will be occupied by government
action can be found in previous federal decisions and in the decisions
of a number of state courts.1 4 Under this test, the vast majority of
cases will be treated as ordinary negligence rather than
constitutional takings.
If the jurisdictional threshold can be overcome, for claims
sounding in takings rather than in torts, both the nature of the
government action and the nature of the plaintiffs property interest
will be at issue. One may reasonably question whether a right to
develop a vulnerable area, such as low-lying property within a
floodplain or coastal zone, inheres in one's property rights, or
whether instead such development is prohibited under background
principles of property law. In addition, a long line of case law from
the Supreme Court and the Claims Court suggests that there is no
taking when a government program damages private property
where the program, in its entirety, has reduced general flood
hazards and is beneficial to the land in question.
Part I of this Article lays bare the inherent and human-made
vulnerabilities of floodplain and coastal properties. To provide
context, Part II turns to the 2011 flood and the claims brought
against the United States for failing to hold back the floodwaters.
Part III examines the nature of claims brought by landowners
seeking compensation from the government when their property is
flooded. This Part argues that takings and torts are different, for
good reason. The government's power to take private property
through appropriation-whether exercised explicitly through
eminent domain proceedings or implicitly through occupation or
regulation-is an affirmative power exercised for the public's
benefit. Such an affirmative power must involve some element of
intent; otherwise the government's action may be tortious, but it is
not unconstitutional. Part IV places the inherent vulnerabilities of
floodplain and coastal properties within background principles of
property law by assessing investment-backed expectations, public
nuisance and public trust doctrines, and government-provided
benefits (or givings). The point is driven home in Part V: the vast
majority of cases involving temporary physical occupations by
flooding are torts, not takings, and those that are characterized as
takings may only be successful if a reasonable investment-backed
expectation in a lawful activity or development is adversely affected
such that the landowner has experienced greater losses than gains
at the hands of the government.
13. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
14. See infra Subpart III.C.
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I. FLOODPLAIN AND COASTAL PROPERTY
Floodplain and coastal dwellers are the most likely populations
to be adversely affected by severe storms and floods, and the risk of
catastrophic impacts is increasing as the earth's climate warms.
The National Climate Assessment projects more winter and spring
precipitation for the northern United States over the course of this
century. 15 The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA")
reports that, by 2100, rising sea levels and increasingly severe
weather will place even more areas of the United States at risk of
extreme flooding, including coastal regions and areas along rivers,
by up to 45%.16
In riverine areas, the increased intensity of flooding due to
climate change is based on heavier rainfall and snowmelt during
storm episodes, while in coastal areas, increased flooding is
primarily due to high winds and atmospheric pressures that produce
large waves and storm surges.17 Although coastal areas make up
only 10% of the United States' landmass, nearly 40% of the
population lives on a coast.18 Population density in coastal shoreline
counties is over six times greater than in the inland counties.19
Population growth is accelerating in these areas. 20 By 2020, nearly
50% of Americans are expected to reside in coastal counties.2 1 In
riverine floodplain areas, populations are expected to grow a
whopping 160% by 2100.22
With growing population and population density comes
increased environmental degradation through erosion, nutrient
runoff, waste disposal, and shoreline alteration (such as levees,
riprap, and other forms of shoreline armoring). Degradation
15. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 32-33 (2014), https://www.globalchange.gov
Ibrowse/reports/climate-change-impacts-united-states-third-national-climate
-assessment-0; see also NAT'L AcADs. OF Scis. ENG'G & MED., ATTRIBUTION OF
EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 100 (2016),
https://www.nap.edu/read/21852/chapter/6#99 (stating that warming may result
in more frequent episodes of heavy rainfall and snowfall).
16. AECOM, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 at 4-7, 5-12 (2013),
http://www.acclimatise.uk.com/login/uploaded/resources/FEMA_NFIP
report.pdf.
17. Id. at ES-2.
18. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION
REPORT: POPULATION TRENDS FROM 1970 TO 2020, at 3 (2013),
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/coastal-population-report.pdf.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. AECOM, supra note 16, at 5-13. Coastal counties are those that are
"directly adjacent to the open ocean, major estuaries, and the Great Lakes," and
which "bear the most direct effects of coastal hazards." NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 18, at 2.
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increases the vulnerability of shorelines and coastal and riverine
properties to devastating storms and floods.23 Meanwhile,
maintaining the integrity of coastal and riverine ecosystems in the
face of increasing development is an even greater challenge for
governments at every level. 24
Most flood control structures were built with average historic
conditions in mind.25 Operators of dams and other structures strive
to release floodwaters in a manner that provides optimal protection
and risk reduction to downstream properties, but changing
conditions will force operators to adapt so their structures continue
to function in the face of more extreme conditions. 26 With respect to
dams, when major storms and flood events occur, water may exceed
the storage capacity of the reservoir behind the dam, and when it
does that water will have to be released.27 It must go somewhere
and, given the law of gravity, it is going to flow downstream,
adversely affecting downstream properties. In all likelihood, some
landowners will be more adversely affected than others, depending
on where they are located downstream and the topography of their
land.28
II. RECURRENT, BUT TEMPORARY, OCCUPATIONS
In 2011, the Missouri River Basin experienced the catastrophic
effects of high rainfall, unprecedented amounts of precipitation and
snowmelt, and extensive flooding. 29 That spring brought the highest
runoff volume since 1898, requiring record releases of water from
upstream reservoirs managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps"). 30 In 2011, runoff into the system was 148% higher than
the historical median. 31 Later in the summer, rainfall was three to
six times the normal amount in the upper Missouri River Basin. 32
23. AECOM, supra note 16, at 5-13.
24. See JR Ball, Louisiana Flood of 2016 Made Worse by Growth-Focused
Policies, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 23, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.nola.com
/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2016/09/louisianafloodof_2016_develo.html
("[R]apid and largely unchecked growth in the suburbs of Baton
Rouge .. . coupled with a degraded natural drainage system, is putting more
people in harm's way.").
25. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 2.
26. Id. at 2, 5.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 18, 20.
29. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-741, MISSOURI RIVER
FLOOD AND DROUGHT 1-2 (2014).
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id. at 14. Annual runoff into the Missouri River system varies
significantly from year to year, with the lowest runoff year being 1931 (10.6
million acre feet ("MAF")) and the historical median being 24.6 MAF. Id. In
2011, runoff amounted to 61 MAF, which would cover all of Oregon one foot
deep. Id.
32. See id. at 16.
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The third-wettest month ever documented was May 2011, and the
fifth-wettest month was July 2011.33 Although the Missouri River
reservoir system is the largest in the United States, with about 73.1
million acre-feet of water storage capacity, it was not enough to hold
back the floodwaters. 34  Independent studies found that the
excessive amount of runoff would have overwhelmed the capacity of
the reservoirs even if they had been nearly empty at the start of the
rainfall. 35
The Corps responded to these extraordinary conditions, in part,
by increasing its releases from the lowermost main stem dam on the
system, Gavins Point.36 Downstream, floodwater carved fifty-foot
deep gouges in the land. 3 7 It also created sand dunes up to fifteen
feet high, some of which are still present on farm fields to this day. 3 8
Most of the damage from inundation and sediment deposition
occurred between river miles 480 and 70039-well over one hundred
miles downstream from Gavins Point.40
All told, the 2011 flood caused three billion dollars in damages
to 1.2 million acres of land. 41 Over one hundred counties and
parishes in seven states were affected. 42 Floodplain farmers lost
33. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR
SYSTEM: 2011 FLOOD REGULATION 18 (2011). In Sioux City, Iowa (the
demarcation between upper and lower basins), runoff measurements smashed
the old 1952 record by one MAF. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 29, at 15.
34. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 29, at 5.
35. See id. at 6; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERVICE ASSESSMENT: THE
MISSOURI/SouRIs FLOODS OF MAY-AUGUST 2011, at x (2012); U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE EFFECTS OF MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM
RESERVOIR SYSTEM OPERATIONS ON 2011 FLOODING USING A PRECIPITATION-
RUNOFF MODELING SYSTEM MODEL 2 (2014).
36. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SEDIMENT
TRANSPORT AND DEPOSITION IN THE LOWER MISSOURI RIVER DURING THE 2011
FLOOD 5 (2013).
37. Josh Funk, Federal Officials Say US Army Corps Shouldn't Be Blamed
for Major Flooding on Missouri River, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 23, 2014,
5:44 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/science/news/articles/2014/06/23
/officials-deny-causing-missouri-river-floods.
38. Id.
39. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 35, at 2.
40. Id. at 5. Gavins Point Dam is located at river mile 811, that is, 811
miles upstream from the Missouri's confluence with the Mississippi River. Id.
41. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. FLOOD Loss REPORT-
WATER YEAR 2011, at 1; Emily Holbrook, Historic Floods of the Big Muddy, RISK
MGMT. (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2011
/08/01/historic-floods-of-the-big-muddy/; Adrian Sainz, Mississippi River Flood
of 2011 Caused $2.8B in Economic Damage: Army Corps, INS. J. (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/02/27/282875.htm.
42. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, 2011 PosT-FLOOD REPORT: MISSISSIPPI
RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES SYSTEM, at ES-II (2012).
198 [Vol. 52
TAKINGS AND TORTS
millions of dollars in crops, but those losses were partially offset by
crop insurance and other disaster payments.43
Over four hundred landowners and two federally recognized
American Indian tribes sued the Corps for Fifth Amendment
takings in response to the flooding. 44 The plaintiffs in Ideker Farms
v. United StateS45 alleged that the Corps caused damage to their
properties by mismanaging the Missouri River reservoir system. 46
Rather than bringing a tort claim, the Ideker plaintiffs relied on
recent Supreme Court precedent, namely Arkansas Game & Fish,
where the Court held that recurrent flooding through operations of a
dam could constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. 47
Although couched as constitutional takings claims, the
Missouri/Mississippi River floodplain owners have lodged a classic
case of negligence. As for a breach of duty, they allege that the
Corps caused damage to their properties by carelessly abandoning
its flood control mission in favor of other priorities. 48 Specifically,
they claim that the Corps kept its upstream reservoirs full to benefit
endangered species, and that full reservoirs meant less storage for
the floodwaters that eventually poured down on them. 49
External reviews confirmed that the Corps's operations were
dictated by unprecedented conditions-abnormal snowmelt and
rainfall-not shifting priorities.5 0 However, if the case was treated
like the tort case it appears to be, these factual questions need not
be resolved because the Corps is immune from tort liability for flood
control activities.5 1 Only if the claims are treated as takings would
it be necessary to delve more deeply into these facts. The distinction
is explored in the following Part.
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 35, at x; see also William
Edwards, Flood Damaged Crops, Crop Insurance Payments, and Lease
Contracts, IOWA ST. U. (Aug. 2011), https://www.extension.iastate.edu
/agdm/articles/edwards/EdwAugl1.html (noting that "nearly 90 percent of
Iowa's corn and soybean acres are protected by multiple peril crop insurance,"
and that, while such policies typically cover 75-80% of losses, in 2011, crops had
even greater protection from loss under Revenue Protection policies).
44. First-Amended Complaint at 1-7, Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States,
No. 1:14-cv-00183-NBF (Fed. Cl. Oct. 15, 2015).
45. Complaint, supra note 3.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012).
48. First-Amended Complaint, supra note 44, at 8.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 35. "The dam reservoirs filled to the brim with heavy
mountain snowmelt and spring rain, but they held. For the first time,
emergency spillway gates were opened for flood control and they worked exactly
as envisioned." Bismarck Tribune, Five Years Later: Garrison Dam Held
During Missouri Flood in 2011, INFORUM (June 1, 2016, 10:38 PM),
http://www.inforum.com/news/4045851-five-years-later-garrison-dam-held
-during-missouri-river-flood-201 1.
51. Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012).
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III. TORTS NOT TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment requires compensation when the
government acquires private property for public purposes, whether
the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a
government appropriation by way of a physical occupation. 52 Fifth
Amendment takings law also requires compensation when a
government regulation prevents a property owner from making
economic use of the property. 53 In either case, the takings doctrine
finds its footing in common law property but also in torts.54
A tort is defined, in broad terms, as a legal wrong for which
there is a private right to sue for a remedy.5 5 All types of torts,
whether they be intentional torts like battery and trespass, fault-
based torts like negligence, or hybrid torts like nuisance,5 6 have
similar objectives: compensating victims of harm; apportioning
risks; allocating the burden of loss equitably among parties; and
preventing future harm by deterring wrongful conduct.57 Beyond
that, the various types of torts have few common characteristics.
Some arise out of bodily injury,5 8 some out of interference with
intangible things, such as reputation,5 9 and still others arise out of
damage to property.6 0
The latter group of torts, including negligence, nuisance, and
trespass, are those that have the most in common with Fifth
Amendment takings, that is, when the actor is the government. Yet
the Takings Clause has a very different purpose than tort law.
Although, like tort liability, it allocates the burden of loss among the
parties to the dispute, the Takings Clause is meant to accomplish
equity between the private property owner, the government, and the
52. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
53. Id. at 330.
54. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2005); see Ridge Line, Inc.
v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Inverse condemnation
law is tied to, and parallels, tort law." (citing 9 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A.
RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G34.03[1] (3d ed. 1980 & Supp. 2002))).
55. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 917, 985 (2010).
56. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 400, at 622 (2d ed. 2011)
(describing private nuisance as "liability for substantial and unreasonable
interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of her land by negligent or
intentional interference, or, more rarely, by strict liability").
57. Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 638-39 (1988).
58. E.g., Cain v. McKinnon, 522 So. 2d 91, 91 (Miss. 1989).
59. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. E.g., Abresch v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 75 N.W.2d 206, 211-12 (Minn. 1956)
(negligence theory); Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So. 2d 312, 317-18 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)
(nuisance theory); Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W.
Va. 1945) (trespass theory).
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public.6 1 When the government seizes or otherwise takes property
in the name of some public purpose, the Takings Clause "bar[s]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." 62
A. Jurisdictional Prerequisites and Immunity
Courts have long struggled to distinguish takings claims from
tort claims. According to the Claims Court, "there is no clear cut
distinction" between the two.63 Courts and commentators alike have
observed that the attempt to find such a distinction is "the lawyer's
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark."6 4 Those who dare
to undertake the quest may find themselves stuck in a "Serbonian
Bog." 65
Yet undertake this quest we must. The distinction between
takings and torts makes a significant difference when it comes to
flood-related claims against the federal government for two reasons.
First, as to jurisdiction, Fifth Amendment takings claims-whether
flood related or otherwise-must be lodged in the Claims Court
pursuant to the Tucker Act, 66 which encompasses "any claim against
the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."6 7
This provision operates as "a broad exclusion of tort cases from the
court's jurisdiction."6 8 A well-founded allegation of something other
61. James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to Establish
Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and
Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 315, 332 (2010).
62. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005) (citing Armstrong in the
context of regulatory takings); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (citing Armstrong in finding a
temporary taking); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480
(2005) (construing "public purpose" to include economic development).
63. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2005).
64. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.15
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting C. HARR, LAND USE PLANNING 766 (3d
ed. 1976)). Justice Brennan went on to say that the distinction between torts
and takings is "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of
contemporary land-use law." Id.
65. Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 80. A Serbonian Bog is "a mess from which
there is no way of extricating oneself. . . '[w]here armies whole have sunk."' 1
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIc NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 12:14 n.19 (2d ed. 2015) (citing JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST,
Book II, line 592 (1667)).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012).
67. Id. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added).
68. Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 95; see Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621,
623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The Court of Federal Claims . . . lacks jurisdiction over
2017] 201
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than ordinary negligence, then, is a necessary prerequisite for
invoking jurisdiction for a takings claim in the Claims Court and
avoiding dismissal. 69
Second, as to flood-related claims, the United States is
statutorily immune from tort liability. The Flood Control Act 70
states, "No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at
any place." 71 The terms "flood" and "floodwaters" have been
construed expansively by the Supreme Court. In United States v.
James,72 the Court found that the Act barred wrongful death claims
arising out of boating accidents on reservoirs created for flood
control but used extensively for recreation and other purposes:
The Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry
floodwaters. It is thus clear ... that the terms "flood" and
"flood waters" apply to all waters contained in or carried
through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related
to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot
control.73
The Court added, "Congress' choice of the language 'any
damage' and 'liability of any kind' further undercuts a narrow
construction" of this immunity provision. 74
Although the Supreme Court subsequently disavowed the dicta
of James that would have immunized projects merely "related to"
flood control,75 it stood by the position that "the phrase 'floods or
flood waters' is not narrowly confined to those waters that a federal
project is unable to control, and that it encompasses waters that are
released for flood control purposes when reservoired waters are at
flood stage."76 It clarified: "the statute directs us to determine the
scope of the immunity conferred, not by the character of the federal
project or the purposes it serves, but by the character of the waters
that cause the relevant damage and the purposes behind their
release."7 7 If "flood waters" caused the harm, the government is
tort actions"); In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States,
799 F.2d 317, 326 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The Court has never treated limitations on
liability in tort as mere pleading obstacles, to be surmounted by shifting ground
to the Tucker Act.").
69. Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 687-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 710 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
71. Id. § 702c.
72. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
73. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001).
76. Id. Central Green noted that James plainly encompassed "waters that
are released for flood control purposes." Id.
77. Id. at 434.
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immune from tort claims for both property damage and personal
injury.78
However, the Flood Control Act does not bar tort claims for
damages caused by the government's navigational structures, such
as the negligence claims arising out of the construction and
operation of a navigational channel in the Gulf of Mexico, which
served as a hurricane superhighway that directed Hurricane
Katrina's storm surge into the heart of New Orleans.7 9 In such
cases, plaintiffs may assert tort claims against the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act80 ("FTCA"), but the United
States may seek dismissal under the immunity provision of that
Act. 81 The FTCA shields the federal government from tort liability
for its discretionary actions, such as how to manage its navigational
channels and whether to change operations to prevent channel
erosion and the storm-surge superhighway effect.82 Under either
statute, but especially the Flood Control Act, plaintiffs harmed by
federal activities related to flooding have a difficult time avoiding
dismissal of their tort claims against the federal government.8 3
78. Id.; James, 478 U.S. at 605. In Central Green, the plaintiffs farm was
subjected to flooding due to an irrigation canal within the Central Valley
Project, a massive, multiple-use project for irrigation, flood control, and other
purposes. Cent. Green, 531 U.S. at 427. The Court noted, "to characterize every
drop of water that flows through that immense project as 'flood water' simply
because flood control is among the purposes served by the project unnecessarily
dilutes the language of the statute" and remanded for a determination of the
character of the waters that caused the damage. Id. at 434.
79. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 444-51 (5th Cir.
2012) (determining that while the government could not claim immunity under
the Flood Control Act for claims related to dredging of the Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet ("MRGO"), the Act did provide immunity against claims stemming
from levee breaches caused by dredging); see also Saint Bernard Par. Gov't v.
United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 747 (2015) (allowing takings claims to proceed
on the same facts); cf. Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 617 (2007)
(finding that flooding was not "the direct, natural, or probable result of
the . . . flood protection system in New Orleans," but instead was the result of
Hurricane Katrina).
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2012).
81. Id. § 2680(a).
82. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 696 F.3d at 452 (finding the
government was immunized under the FTCA for claims related to discretionary
operations of navigational projects).
83. See id. Courts have presumed that the Flood Control Act's immunity
provision does not bar takings claims because a statutory provision cannot
abrogate a constitutional mandate, such as the Fifth Amendment. Lenoir v.
Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir. 1978); Turner v.
United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 447, 455 (1991).
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B. Nature of Government Action: Intentional Occupation or
Ordinary Negligence
Claimants alleging a government-induced appropriation of
property bear the burden of alleging sufficient facts to show that
treatment under takings law, rather than tort law, is appropriate. 84
If the grievances are bona fide takings claims, the United States
"must proceed subject to the limitations imposed by [the] Fifth
Amendment, and can take [property] only on payment of just
compensation."8 5
A compensatory taking can occur in several different ways. The
Fifth Amendment requires compensation when the government
affirmatively exercises its power of eminent domain to condemn a
property and take title to it.86 Besides this kind of overt act,
governments take property in a variety of other ways. "Implicit
takings" include inverse condemnation by regulation and takings by
invasion or occupation, where the government did not intend to take
title but effectively did so by its actions.87 The latter category of
implicit takings is the focus of this Article.
In rare cases where a government action causes a permanent
physical occupation of the property to accomplish some public
purpose or denies all economically beneficial use of the property, a
per se taking will be found. 88 That is, compensation must be paid
unless the interest in question was already limited by a background
principle of law that inhered in the claimant's title.89 By contrast,
as established in Penn Central Transportation v. New York City,9 0
when the government goes "too far" in impacting the claimant's
property, courts apply a balancing test. 91
84. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
85. Turner v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 832, 834 (1989) (quoting
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893)).
86. Eminent domain is "[tihe inherent power of a governmental entity to
take privately owned property . .. and convert it to public use, subject to
reasonable compensation for the taking." Eminent Domain, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
87. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 10, at 40 (describing implicit takings as
"all takings that arise outside the context of explicit takings by condemnation").
The roots of this doctrine are found in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., where a
government-authorized dam permanently flooded private property. 80 U.S.
166, 167 (1871).
88. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2001) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115
(1951)); see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Yee
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
90. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
91. Id. at 124..
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In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,92 the
Court found a per se taking where the government compelled the
placement of a cable box on an apartment building.93 Although the
box was small and did not interfere with the private use of the
building, the Court nonetheless found an intentional, permanent
physical invasion for which compensation was required. 94 Loretto
shed light on the "physical invasion" line of cases, in making a clear
demarcation between temporary invasions, which are not per se
takings, 95 and permanent occupations of property, for which courts
"uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation." 96
The reason: "[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of
property rights."97 When the government permanently occupies
private property, it "does not simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a
slice of every strand."9 8
Cases where temporary invasion or damage to private property
results from a government action, but where the government had no
actual intent to damage the property, much less to occupy it, pose
the greatest difficulties for courts attempting to distinguish between
a tort and a taking. Damages caused by flooding often fall within
this legal purgatory. Just as there is no bright-line rule against
treating such events as takings, there is no bright-line rule that
would treat all flooding "caused by or partially attributable to
governmental activities" as takings. 99
92. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
93. Id. at 426, 441.
94. Id. at 419.
95. Id. at 435 n.12; see id. at 427-28 (distinguishing Pumpelly as a
permanent invasion requiring compensation from Northern Transportation Co.
v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879), where a temporary dam installed during the
construction of a tunnel did not require compensation).
96. Id. at 434 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
[T]his Court has consistently distinguished between flooding cases
involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and
cases involving a more temporary invasion, or government action
outside the owner's property that causes consequential damages
within, on the other. A taking has always been found only in the
former situation.
Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 435-36 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-
80 (1979)).
98. Id. at 435. "Property rights in a physical thing have been described as
the rights 'to possess, use and dispose of it.' To the extent that the government
permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these
rights." Id. (citation omitted).
99. Nat'l By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273 (Ct. Cl.
1969); see Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317, 324 (2013) ("The
distinction between tort and takings in the flooding cases is not as easy as
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Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,100 where the construction of a dam
caused a lake to flood the plaintiffs property,10 represents one of
the Supreme Court's earliest assessments of causation in the
takings context. Pumpelly involved "an almost complete destruction
of the value of the land."1 02 The Court held that "where real estate
is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand,
or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it,
so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking,
within the meaning of the Constitution."1 0 3 Where a physical
occupation of private property constitutes a direct (as opposed to
consequential) injury, compensation as a taking is required. In
another early case, Gibson v. United States,104 the Court concluded
that a government dike that made the plaintiffs landing unusable
at certain times of the year was not a compensable taking.105 The
Court explained, "the damage of which [the plaintiff] complained
was not the result of the taking of any part of her property, whether
upland or submerged, or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental
consequence of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental
power."e06 An incidental invasion, in other words, may be a tort, but
it is not a taking.
From Pumpelly and Gibson, we gather that damage to property
due to government occupation is compensable as a taking where the
occupation is either (1) intentionally accomplished for a public
purpose, or (2) the direct result of, and not merely an incidental
injury induced by, government action.107 Of course, this begs the
question: What is direct versus incidental? Federal precedent has
been anything but definitive.
In Sanguinetti v. United States,0 the Supreme Court found
that temporary, increased flooding of private land was not a taking
when the land in question had flooded periodically prior to the
construction of the offending canal.109 The plaintiff failed to show
that the overflow was the "direct or necessary result" of the canal,
within the contemplation of the government, so as to constitute an
actual invasion of the land amounting to an appropriation of and not
saying one flood is a tort and any more than that a taking." (citing Ark. Game &
Fish Comm'n v. United States, 648 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J.,
dissenting))).
100. 80 U.S. 166 (1872).
101. Id. at 177.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 181.
104. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
105. Id. at 275.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.; Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
108. 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
109. Id. at 149.
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merely an injury to the property. 110 Like Gibson, Sanguinetti drew
a distinction between incidental consequences and direct results.",
Similarly, in National By-Products, Inc. v. United States,112 the
Claims Court dismissed a takings claim where the plaintiff
experienced extreme flooding on two occasions after the government
constructed a levee on the left bank of a creek without a
corresponding levee on the right bank. 113 In building the levee on
the left bank, the government did not knowingly induce floods to the
plaintiffs right-bank property or take a de facto flowage easement
over that property. 114 Nor could the plaintiff show that flooding
would inevitably recur. 115 Rather, rainfall had been unusually
severe, and the downstream portion of the creek was constricted
with debris and silt, creating greater pressure on the plaintiffs
right-bank levee. 116  The Claims Court concluded that, where
flooding is "the result of a particular 'concatenation of physical
conditions' . . . which plaintiff has not shown will continue to occur,"
an action must lie, if at all, in tort rather than takings.1 1 7
By contrast, in United States v. Cress,11s the government's
construction of a lock and dam was a taking because it subjected the
plaintiffs' lands, ford, and mill site to "direct invasion" by frequent
"intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows" due to the
backwater naturally created by the structure. 119 As in Cress, in
United States v. Lynah,120 the construction of a dam in such a
manner as to alter a stream's natural flow and, "as the necessary
result," raise the water levels above the dam and overflow the
plaintiffs land, made it "an irreclaimable bog," unfit for any
agricultural use, resulted in a taking.121
110. Id. at 149-50. "[I]t is, at least, necessary that the overflow be the direct
result of the structure ... ." Id. at 149.
111. Id.
112. 405 F.2d 1256 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
113. Id. at 1274-75.
114. Id. at 1257.
115. Id. at 1274.
116. Id. The flooding was partially due to the weakness of plaintiffs own
levee, a condition that would not necessarily continue into the future. Id.; see
Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 23 (1913) (holding that flooding following
the construction of levees at certain points along the river, without building
levees in other places, was too remote to be a taking); Hughes v. United States,
230 U.S. 24, 34 (1913) (similar).
117. Nat'l By-Prods., 405 F.2d at 1274 (citing N. Ctys. Hydro-Elec. Co. v.
United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 241, 248 (1965)); see Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States,
346 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (remanding a shopping center owner's claim that the
government had taken a flowage easement by constructing an adjacent, up-
gradient post office that increased stormwater runoff to the center to determine
whether increased runoff was the direct result of construction).
118. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
119. Id. at 327-28.
120. 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
121. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
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More recently, in Arkansas Game & Fish,122 a landowner, the
State Fish and Game Commission, prevailed on its claim that the
Corps had physically taken a flowage easement over its land. 123 The
case raised a unique set of facts and the decision should be
considered a narrow one.
In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Corps opted to depart from its
Master Water Control Plan ("Master Plan") for the Clearwater Dam
by releasing water over longer periods each year during a seven-
year period, not because of any physical imperative (unusual
amounts of rain or snow) but because farmers urged it to keep their
croplands dry for longer periods during the growing season. 124 The
deviation caused a dramatic and inevitably recurring increase in
flooding in a wildlife area owned by the State, causing widespread
and permanent damage to its trees.125 The Commission established
that the flooding was significant enough, for long enough periods, to
change the character of the area and substantially interfere with the
ability to use its land. 126 It also established that the Corps's flooding
of its land was the direct cause of the predictable-indeed,
predicted-destruction of the property. 127 The Corps deviated from
its Master Plan in order to benefit the farmers, even when it had
been put on notice that the deviation would inevitably destroy the
State's land. 128 According to the Supreme Court, the Corps had
effectively taken title to the land without paying for it and without
going through the appropriate processes for exercising its power of
eminent domain. 129 The Corps intentionally created winners and
losers, and the Supreme Court forced it to pay the losers.
The government took the extreme position in Arkansas Game &
Fish that a temporary flooding of land could never constitute a
taking of property. 130 The Court flatly rejected this argument.
122. 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
123. Id. at 1372.
124. Id. at 1368.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1371.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1373-74.
129. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012).
A professor's amicus brief pointed out that, under Arkansas law, the plaintiff
had no vested entitlement to unaltered river flows in view of the legal rights of
other riparian owners, such as the Corps, to modify the flow for their own
reasonable needs. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 24 n.139. At the very
least, a takings claimant should be required to show that the government's
actions produced effects that exceeded what was already permitted under state
water law. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924)
(dismissing a takings claim where, prior to construction, the land had been
subject to the same periodic overflow). The Court acknowledged the potential
relevance of this issue but ruled that it had been waived. Ark. Game & Fish,
133 S. Ct. at 522 n.1.
130. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 519-20.
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Instead, it held that a temporary invasion can be a taking, but it is
not a per se taking.13 1 Rather, such claims "turn on situation-
specific factual inquiries" with reference to the "particular
circumstances of each case."132
According to the Court, government-induced flooding must
cause "sustained and substantial damage-if not permanent
flooding, then at the very least it must result in a 'permanent
liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows."' 133 The
Court reasoned that "direct and immediate interference"l 34 with
private property through inevitably recurring flooding gives rise to a
takings claim "no less valid than the claim of an owner whose land
was continuously kept under water." 35  Conversely, isolated
incidents may constitute a tort but do not rise to the level of a
taking.136
The Arkansas Game & Fish Court identified relevant factors
that bear on the inquiry: (1) the duration of the flooding; (2) whether
the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized
government action; (3) the character of the land at issue and the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations regarding the
land's use; and (4) the severity of the interference.1 3 7 With the
caveat on foreseeability discussed below, all of these factors appear
in other takings cases except the third: "the character of the land at
issue."1 38 The traditional third factor in the Penn Central balancing
test for takings analyses is "the character of the governmental
131. Id.
132. Id. at 518, 522; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted).
133. Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 616 (2007) (quoting United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)). In Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922), the Court found that a taking would
occur only if the government acted "with the purpose and effect of subordinating
[plaintiffs] land . . . to the right and privilege of the Government to fire
projectiles directly across it." Id. at 329. It added: "[E]ven when the
intent ... is not admitted, while a single act may not be enough, a continuance
of them in sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove it." Id. at 329-
30.
134. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 519 (quoting United States v. Causby,
328-U.S. 256, 266 (1946)).
135. Id. at 519.
136. Id.; Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 53-54 (2012); see
In re Tenn. Valley Auth. Ash Spill Litig., 805 F. Supp. 2d 468, 492-95 (E.D.
Tenn. 2011) (finding that the presence of coal ash spilled on the plaintiffs' land
failed to diminish plaintiffs' rights substantially enough for a taking, where the
Tennessee Valley Authority did not engage in deliberate conduct directed at the
plaintiffs' land, but allowing various tort claims to proceed).
137. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 522.
138. See, e.g., id.
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action."13 9  Throughout the past century of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized, "[i]t is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it ... that
determines the question whether it is a taking."140 The Arkansas
Game & Fish Court cited Penn Central, but inexplicably left this
elemental factor out.141
As to the character of the government action being challenged-
the nature of the alleged "invasion"-Penn Central directs courts to
consider "[t]he purposes served, as well as the effects produced," to
inform the analysis: "[A] use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of
a substantial public purpose ... or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh
impact upon the owner's use of the property." 142 Although Penn
Central involved regulatory restrictions, temporary physical
invasions invoke the same analytical elements.1 43
In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Court should have considered
the character of the Corps's action in light of the degree and severity
of flooding and the need to maximize benefits and minimize harms
from the Clearwater Dam.1 44 If it had, it may have noted that
Congress authorized the flood control program that led to the
construction of the Clearwater Dam after the Great Flood of 1927,
which stimulated extensive federal involvement in flood control to
benefit and protect floodplain owners throughout the Mississippi
139. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(emphasis added); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)
("Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending
on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action."
(emphasis added) (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104)); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (finding no taking where
"the character of the governmental action . . . [was] to arrest . . . a significant
threat to the common welfare").
140. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 149 (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S.
316, 328 (1917)); see Saint Bernard Par. Gov't v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl.
687, 738 (2015).
141. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518.
142. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 127).
143. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 522; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
632-33; Cress, 243 U.S. at 328.
144. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 522; see John Echeverria, The
"Character" Factor in Regulatory Takings Analysis, SK081 ALI-ABA 143, 146
(2005) (stating that outside the per se takings context, "the traditional Penn
Central analysis-including the 'character' factor-continues to reign
supreme").
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River Basin (including part of Arkansas).1 45 The same piece of
legislation included the sovereign immunity provision that would
have defeated the plaintiffs' claim had it been characterized as a tort
rather than a taking. 146
Unfortunately, the strategy adopted by the government in
defending this case, i.e., temporary inundations are never takings,
meant that several of the key issues were not preserved for
review.1 47 As a result, the opinion on remand focused narrowly on
foreseeability and the extent of damage to the State's land.148
To compound the problem, the lower courts got it wrong,
particularly with respect to foreseeability. On remand in Arkansas
Game & Fish, the Federal Circuit affirmed the original Claims
Court decision that found a taking of the State's property because
the Corps "could have foreseen that the series of deviations
approved during the 1990s would lead to substantially increased
flooding of the Management Area and, ultimately, to the loss of
large numbers of trees there."1 4 9 In finding that the Corps "could
have foreseen" that its actions "would lead to substantially increased
flooding," the Federal Circuit effectively transformed takings law
into negligence law, 5 0 and it appears to have applied an even lower
threshold than would be demanded by proximate cause.
Foreseeability, whether in tort or takings, but particularly in the
takings context, requires more than just a possibility of some risk of
145. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 30 n.184 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 702c
(2012)); see Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River
Tragedies: A Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1485-87
(2007).
146. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 602-03 (1986) ("[I]n enacting
§ 702c as part of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 'Congress was concerned with
allocating the costs of a major public works program between the federal
government and the state and local interests, both public and private, in the
wake of a financial, administrative, and engineering debacle [from the great
Mississippi River flood of 1927]."' (quoting James v. United States, 760 F.2d
590, 596 (5th Cir. 1985))); supra text accompanying notes 70-74 (discussing the
Flood Control Act's immunity provision).
147. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) ("[T]emporary conditions cannot result in the taking of a flowage
easement."), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012); Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at
10.
148. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1370-81
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
149. Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 1372-73 (emphasis added); see Abrams & Bertensen, supra note
9, at 11 (concluding that the result "transmutes flooding case takings law into a
determination that closely tracks the elements of tort recovery"). Arguably, the
test applied by the Federal Circuit would not even rise to the level of proximate
cause in a tort case. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101
(N.Y. 1928) (finding the chain of causation too attenuated when railroad
employees dislodged a package from a passenger's hands and the package
exploded, toppling a set of scales at the opposite end of the platform such that
they fell on another passenger).
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harm; at the very least, the injury to the property must be the
predictable and probable consequence of the government's act. 151
In Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States,152 a case that preceded
Arkansas Game & Fish, the Claims Court carefully distinguished
torts from takings by demanding more than a mere possibility of
incidental harm to establish a taking. 153 There, landowners who
owned parcels located within the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway
on the Mississippi River alleged that the Corps took their property
without just compensation when the Corps activated the floodway
by intentionally breaching the levee that protected their property,
causing flood damage to their land and crops, as well as leaving
behind detrimental sand and gravel deposits. 154 The Corps had
purchased flowage easements for most of the floodway, but plaintiffs
claimed that the damage exceeded the scope of the easements. 155
The court explained that a property loss is compensable as a taking
only if the government intends to invade a protected property
interest, or if the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or probable
result of, and not the incidental injury inflicted by, the government
action.156 Moreover, the government's invasion must appropriate a
benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner, or
at least preempt the owner's right to enjoy his property for an
extended period of time. 15 7 In the end, the floodway plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that the Corps's interference with their property
rights was substantial and frequent enough to rise to that level. 158
"Rather, the sand and gravel deposits and attendant flooding are
tortious 'injur[ies] that reduce[] [the] value' of plaintiffs' farmland,
but do not appropriate it for government use." 159 Because the
plaintiffs raised de facto tort claims rather than takings claims, the
court found that the Flood Control Act immunized the government
151. See, e.g., John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 145-46
(1921); Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Ridge
Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Cotton
Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 233-35 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (concluding
that, when loss due to flooding "resulted naturally from the [government]
improvement" (a dam), it was not a mere consequential injury but could be
treated as a taking; "if engineers had studied the question in advance they
would, we suppose, have predicted what occurred" (emphasis added));
foreseeability discussion infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
152. 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (2012).
153. Id. at 53-54.
154. Id. at 50.
155. Id. at 52.
156. Id. at 56-59.
157. Id. at 58-59.
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id. (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
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from liability arising from damages associated with operation of the
floodway. 160
Just a year later, in Quebedeaux v. United States,16 1 the same
court discounted Big Oak Farms because that case was handed
down before the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Game &
Fish.162 The Quebedeaux court opined that, with the guideposts
provided by the Supreme Court, "a different decision [in Big Oak
Farms] would have been reached."1 63 However, Quebedeaux was a
different kind of case entirely.
Quebedeaux involved property within the Morganza Floodway,
which is part of a comprehensive federal system of levees, dams, and
other installations designed to control floods on the Mississippi
River. 164 During extreme flood events, the Morganza Spillway can
be opened to divert water through the Morganza Floodway from the
Mississippi into the Atchafalaya River Basin. 165 During the 2011
flood, the Corps opened the Morganza Spillway to prevent flooding
downriver and to protect the levees in Baton Rouge and New
Orleans. 166 As a consequence, the Morganza Floodway property
owners were inundated with water for nearly two months, damaging
crops, farms, homes, businesses, oil and gas wells, and other real
and personal property.167 Plaintiffs alleged that the Corps's
intentional diversion of water onto the Morganza Floodway
constituted "an ongoing, continuous and permanent physical taking"
of their property, and that the existence of the comprehensive flood
control system evidenced the government's "permanent commitment
to the intermittent, but inevitably recurring, flooding of plaintiffs'
property and businesses," thereby effectively reserving a federal
flowage easement over the affected property. 168
The Quebedeaux court declined to adopt a bright-line rule
according to which "a single flooding event may not give rise to a
takings," as the government had urged it to do.169 According to
Quebedeaux, "Counting floods is not the controlling consideration.
The question, rather, is whether defendant has appropriated an
interest for itself in the subject property-and that inquiry requires
an examination of multiple factors, certainly beyond whether actual
flooding has occurred once, twice, or even a dozen times."170 Even a
160. Id. at 53.
161. 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013).
162. Id. at 325 n.10.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 319.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 319-20.
168. Id. at 320.
169. Id. at 323, 325.
170. Id. at 324.
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single flooding event can be treated as a taking if that event
evidences the government's intent to appropriate an interest in the
property. 171 Accordingly, the Quebedeaux court remanded the case
to provide plaintiffs with the opportunity to develop facts in support
of their claims. 172
The problem lies not only in the Arkansas Game & Fish opinion
on remand and the Quebedeaux case that followed Arkansas Game
& Fish, but in the Federal Circuit's continuing failure to draw a
clear distinction between foreseeability for purposes of tort liability
and foreseeability for purposes of takings liability. In Hansen v.
United States,173 the court lamented the serpentine case law:
The fact that the law of takings and the law of property torts
share common origins renders problematic any argument that
tort and takings claims can never arise from the same common
facts. Indeed, because tort "pervades the entire law, and is so
interlocked at every point with property, contract and other
accepted classifications," "the student of law soon discovers
[that] the categories are quite arbitrary."174
As the Hansen court pointed out, "every taking that involves
invasion or destruction of property is [also] by definition tortious." 75
Yet "not all torts are takings." 7 6 Indeed, most cases involving
property damage will not be takings, but instead only torts.1 77
[T]he flooding cases seem to focus on periodicity only as one indication
as to whether defendant has appropriated an interest for itself in the
affected property. While a single flooding may indicate that such an
interest has not been taken, that conclusion depends upon whether
the flooding was truly an "[ilsolated invasion," as opposed to an event
that characterizes a "permanent liability to intermittent but
inevitably recurring overflows."
Id. at 323 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 324.
172. Id. at 325 (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 511, 522 (2012)); see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982) ("[A]s ... the intermittent flooding cases reveal, [
temporary limitations are subject to a more complex balancing process."); Krier
& Sterk, supra note 10, at 56 (stating that temporary invasions are takings only
if the Penn Central factors weigh against the government).
173. 65 Fed. Cl. 76 (2005).
174. Id. at 101 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 2 (5th ed. 1984)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 324 ("[Tlhe distinction between tort
and takings in the flooding cases is not as easy as saying one flood is a tort and
any more than that a taking." (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United
States, 648 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting))); see also
Nat'l By-Prods. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("The
distinction between 'permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring
overflows', and occasional floods induced by government projects ... is, of
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In passing the immunity provision of the Flood Control Act,178
Congress was aware that most downstream losses caused by
postconstruction flood control actions would go uncompensated.1 79
Specifically, Representative Snell stated: "I want this bill so drafted
that it will contain all the safeguards necessary for the Federal
Government.. . . I for one do not want to open up a situation that
will cause thousands of lawsuits for damages against the Federal
Government in the next 10, 20, or 50 years."18 0 The immunity
provision reflects Congress's reluctance to take any steps to commit
the federal government to flood control in the early twentieth
century. Federal involvement in navigation had been recognized as
squarely within the Commerce Clause powers, 181 with flood control
seen as a state and local concern, until a series of devastating floods
in the 1920s persuaded Congress to get involved with federal
expertise and resources for flood control on the condition that
federal liability be limited.182
Given Congress's clear intention to provide blanket tort
immunity for damages arising from federal flood control efforts,
when courts allow flood-related tort claims to proceed under the
guise of takings claims, they intrude on the "zone of sovereign
immunity" that Congress explicitly refused to surrender. 183 Also,
because waivers of sovereign immunity are read narrowly,18 4 the
government's action must inevitably lead to recurring flooding to
avoid dismissal as a tort claim. 185
course, not a clear and definite guideline." (quoting United States v. Cress, 243
U.S. 316, 328 (1917))).
178. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012).
179. See id.
180. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 19-20 (citing 69 CONG. REC. 6641
(1928) (statement of Rep. Snell)).
181. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824).
182. Sandra B. Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a
Post-Katrina World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 601 (2007); see supra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text (regarding Clearwater Dam).
183. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 20; see John Echeverria, Takings
and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1093 (2000) (arguing that treating erroneous
government actions as takings masks the tension between "the strong historical
traditions supporting the various immunity doctrines" and the desire to provide
a remedy to aggrieved plaintiffs).
184. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)
(stating that waivers of immunity must be "unequivocally expressed"; "the
Government's consent to be sued 'must be "construed strictly in favor of the
sovereign," and not "enlarge[d] ... beyond what the language requires"'"
(citations omitted)).
185. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518-19
(2012) (citing United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)); see Barnes v.
United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870-73 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (finding a taking of a flowage
easement resulting from frequent and inevitably recurring flooding as the
natural consequence of government control of a river's flow through a nearby
dam).
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According to a leading Supreme Court case on temporary
physical takings, United States v. Causby,186 "it is the character of
the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it
is a taking." 187 The very nature of a taking, versus a tort, supplies
the foundation for this critical distinction. As an element of a
takings claim based on a physical intrusion or occupation of
property, intent helps discern whether government actions are
"tantamount to appropriations of private property for a public
purpose." 188
[W]here compensation is sought for injuries caused by physical
invasions or occupations of property, the intent element of a
takings claim is fundamental in distinguishing between those
actions that are the equivalent of an exercise of eminent
domain and those that are actionable as ordinary torts. The
power of eminent domain is affirmative in nature. It is a power
exercised for a particular purpose-the public's benefit-and
intentionally.189
The following Subpart raises an alternative mode of analysis for
distinguishing torts from takings that could sharpen the distinction
between the two, do a better job of fulfilling the burden-alleviating
objective of the takings doctrine, and lead to more predictable and
constitutionally coherent results in takings cases. 190
C. Substantial Certainty as Benchmark
An array of decisions by the federal courts have sown the seeds
of confusion by failing to clearly delineate the tort-takings
distinction and, in too many cases, by misapplying the relevant
concepts of intent and foreseeability. Courts agree that "accidental,
unintended injuries inflicted by governmental actors are treated as
186. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
187. Id. at 266.
188. Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 328 P.3d 1261, 1270 (Or. 2014); see
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1922) (finding that intent can be implied, for purposes of a taking, through a
series of recurring trespasses); Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[N]ot every 'invasion' of private property resulting from
government activity amounts to an appropriation.").
189. Dunn, 328 P.3d at 1270 (emphasis added) (citing In re Chi., Milwaukee,
Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 799 F.2d 317, 325-26 (7th Cir.
1986)); see Nat'1 Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S.
85, 93-94 (1969) (finding that damage to a building used as a military command
post during an insurrection was not a taking); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co.
v. United States, 260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922) (finding that damage to a bridge
caused by the government's blasting was not a taking).
190. See Aaronson v. United States, 79 F.2d 139, 139-41 (D.C. Cir. 1935)
(explaining how the Takings Clause strives to accomplish equity between the
property owner, the government, and the public).
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torts, not takings," 191 and that "but for" causation as applied in
ordinary tort cases is not sufficient for takings claims. 192 Beyond
that, the cases run the gamut. Following the decision on remand in
Arkansas Game & Fish, the line between torts and takings has
become even murkier. 19 3 Yet the Supreme Court did not envision a
sea change in takings law in its decision in Arkansas Game & Fish:
"We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding
temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings
Clause inspection." 1 94 However, by applying a test based on mere
probability, a sea change seems to be precisely what the Federal
Circuit spawned on remand.195
Prior to the remand in Arkansas Game & Fish, courts
struggling with the distinction between tort claims and takings
claims often referred to a "direct, natural, or probable result" test for
takings claims. 196 It was not always altogether clear what this
phrase meant exactly or whether it was intended to be disjunctive or
conjunctive, but there are good reasons that the phrase should be
construed similarly to the "substantial certainty" test for intentional
torts.
Looking to the nature of the Takings Clause, the most obvious
takings-seizures and appropriations of property-involve
purposeful government conduct undertaken for a particular public
use. 197 When the takings doctrine is being extended to temporary
occupations, courts should insist on proof of a purposeful act
191. In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 799 F.2d at 326.
[I]f planes owned by the government regularly overfly a farm, causing
the chickens to kill themselves in fright, this planned operation may
"take" an easement across the farm. But if a stray military plane
crashes into a chicken coop, killing an equal number of fowl, this is a
tort rather than a taking ....
Id. at 326 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 256).
192. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76 (2005), is an outlier. In finding
that "but for" causation sufficed for a takings claim, the court argued that
requiring intent would be a throwback to pre-Tucker Act jurisprudence, when
plaintiffs cast their takings claims (over which the Claims Court did not yet
have jurisdiction) as implied-in-fact contract claims (over which the court did
have jurisdiction). Id. at 106-10. As Hansen noted, post-Tucker Act cases de-
emphasized the role of intent, but the Hansen court went beyond de-emphasis-
its approach would utterly eradicate intent. Id. at 111. See infra notes 254-58.
193. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1372-74
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
194. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012).
195. Ark. Game & Fish, 736 F.3d at 1373-74.
196. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
197. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984) (finding
that Hawaii's land condemnation scheme that transferred title to real property
from lessors to lessees in order to reduce concentration of land ownership
satisfied the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment); Mo. Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896) (invalidating a condemnation order
for lack of a justifying public purpose).
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undertaken to accomplish a public use, so that takings law remains
true to its constitutional objectives. 198 The requirement that a
taking be for public use precludes takings claims premised on
erroneous government actions and government actions with
unintended consequences. 199
Where actual purpose or intent cannot be proven, the threshold
for a constitutional taking, as for intentional torts, should be a
substantial certainty that the particular consequence (damage to
specified private property) will result.200 The familiar distinction
between negligence and intentional torts is useful in drawing a
distinction between negligence and takings. 201 Intentionally taking
a risk that some consequence may occur is not the same as having a
purpose or a substantial certainty that the consequence will
result.2 0 2 As discussed more fully below, substantial certainty is less
than actual knowledge, or even absolute certainty, but more than
simple probability.203
Admittedly, substantial certainty is not an especially
easy standard to apply,204 but it is no more slippery than
198. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that
excessively burdensome regulations, like permanent invasions that eviscerate
an owner's right to exclude others-"perhaps the most fundamental of all
property interests"-are the "[functional] equivalent" of direct seizures and
appropriations); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)
(noting that, prior to the early twentieth century, "it was generally thought that
the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the
functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession
(citations omitted)).
199. See Echeverria, supra note 183, at 1049 (arguing that an erroneous
government action can never be a compensable taking for "public use").
200. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles Part II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without
Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 53, 83 (1990).
201. In addition to common law tort claims, courts are called on to
distinguish between intent and negligence (or recklessness) in workers'
compensation, insurance, and bankruptcy cases. Kenneth W. Simons, A
Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (2006).
Also, the government's sovereign immunity shields it from liability for
intentional torts, despite waivers of immunity for fault-based torts. Id.
202. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 396-97; see Taylor v. Vallelunga, 339 P.2d
910, 911-12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (dismissing an intentional infliction of
distress claim where plaintiff failed to allege that defendants knew she was
present while beating her father because there was no evidence they acted with
purpose or substantial certainty of causing her distress); Garratt v. Dailey, 279
P.2d 1091, 1095 (Wash. 1955) (remanding an intentional tort claim for a finding
of whether a boy, in moving a chair, knew with substantial certainty that
plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been).
203. See infra notes 247-53.
204. See Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the
Restatement (Third)'s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1170, 1173
(2001) (opining that substantial certainty "resembles no intuitively familiar
mental state and is famously difficult to explain to skeptical first year
students").
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foreseeability. 205  Like foreseeability, the substantial certainty
standard "serve[s], however imperfectly, the practical needs of
litigation,"20 6 and, in particular, takings litigation because it serves
as a proxy for intent.
A number of state courts employ substantial certainty as a
benchmark for takings claims where purposeful intent cannot be
shown. 207 The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, applies a
relatively clear test in requiring claimants attempting to establish
the requisite intent to appropriate property to show that the
consequences of the government's action are "necessary, inevitable,
or substantially certain to result." 20 8 It is not enough to establish a
cause-in-fact relationship; the result must follow with a high degree
of certainty, not just as one of many possible consequences that may
or may not follow from the government's action. 209 A substantially
certain consequence is one that will ordinarily and directly follow-
"the necessary or inevitable result of undertaking a particular
act." 2 10
205. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739,
740 (2005) ("For those responsible for understanding tort doctrine, the concept
of foreseeability is a scourge, and its role in negligence cases is a vexing,
crisscrossed morass.").
206. Sebok, supra note 204, at 1174 (citing James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1136
(2001)).
207. See Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Ark. 1990)
("[W]hen one knows that an invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is substantially certain to result from one's conduct, the
invasion is intentional.") ;Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D. Conn.
2006) (stating that the government must either act for the purpose of causing
the harm or know that the harm is substantially certain to); Electro-Jet Tool &
Mfg. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 845 P.2d 770, 777 (N.M. 1992) (holding
"knowledge that the damage was substantially certain to result" to be a
sufficient basis for a takings claim); State v. Beasley, 903 N.E.2d 1196, 1203
(Ohio 2009) (acting "with knowledge amounting to a substantial certainty that
its conduct would cause such damage" can be a taking); Harris Cty. Flood
Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 800 (Tex. 2016) (applying "substantial
certainty" to a takings claim arising from flooding); see also Miller v. Mayor of
Morristown, 20 A. 61, 63 (N.J. 1890) (specifying that takings liability may be
imposed for "natural and inevitable" consequences); Great N. Ry. Co. v. State,
173 P. 40, 42-43 (Wash. 1918) (stating that a taking arises where damage is the
"necessary" result of government activity).
208. Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 328 P.3d 1261, 1270-71 (Or. 2014).
209. Id. at 1271.
210. Id. While Dunn examined a claim arising under Oregon law, the court
explained that "a test that looks to the inevitability or certainty with which
particular results will follow from particular government action appears
consistent with the way that the natural and ordinary consequences has been
understood by courts in general, and federal courts in particular." Id. at 1271-
72; see Jed Michael Silversmith, Takings, Torts & Turmoil: Reviewing the
Authority Requirement of the Just Compensation Clause, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 359, 379-83 (2001) (noting that the "natural and probable
consequences" test, as used in takings cases for over a century, turns on
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In Harris County Flood Control District v. Kerr,2 11 the Texas
Supreme Court dispensed with claims similar to those brought by
the Missouri River floodplain owners. 212  About four hundred
homeowners whose homes suffered damage during storms in 1998,
2001, and 2002 alleged that Harris County had taken their property
by approving unmitigated development upstream without
implementing a previously approved flood control plan. 2 1 3 In an
attempt to prove that the incident was a taking and not ordinary
negligence, plaintiffs' expert testified that the development "was
substantially certain to result in increased flooding along the bayou
in the vicinity of the Plaintiffs' properties." 214 In rejecting their
claims, the court explained that substantial certainty is a more
discrete inquiry with a much higher threshold: plaintiffs must show
that the government was aware that its specific act "is causing
identifiable harm"-i.e., "specific property damage"-to "certain
private property." 215 Proof of "mere negligent conduct" on the part of
the government does not suffice. 216
The Harris County court held that there can be no taking
"where the government only knows that someday, somewhere, its
performance of a general governmental function, such as granting
permits or approving plats, will result in damage to some
unspecified parcel of land within its jurisdiction." 217 As a practical
matter, governments "cannot be expected to insure against every
misfortune occurring within their geographical boundaries. . . . No
government could afford such obligations."2 18
certainty-i.e., could the government ascertain "to a certainty" that the
destruction of plaintiffs property would result).
211. 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016).
212. Complaint, supra note 3, at 6-7.
213. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 499 S.W.3d at 796-97. Plaintiffs' claims
arose under the Texas takings clause, article I, section 17. Id. at 799.
214. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 799.
217. Id. at 800; see also City of Austin v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 431 S.W.3d 817,
826 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that damage to property due to a fire, ignited
when power lines came into contact during high winds, was not a "substantially
certain consequence" of a decision to discontinue power line inspections); cf. Bd.
of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 16-0076,
2017 WL 382402, at *15-16 (Iowa Jan. 27, 2017) (dismissing takings claims
against drainage districts that permitted nitrate-laden runoff to exceed water
quality standards); Fromm v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 847 N.W.2d 845, 853-54
(Wis. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the failure to act on knowledge about the
relative elevations of plaintiffs property and a government dam to prevent
flooding during heavy rainstorms did not support a takings claim).
218. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 499 S.W.3d at 804; see id. at 804 n.7
("[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is
not a suicide pact." (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160
(1963))); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("[I]f the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
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Prior to the Arkansas Game & Fish opinion on remand, 219 some
federal courts demanded similar proof to allow physical takings
claims to proceed. Instead of "substantial certainty," however, these
courts typically required plaintiff to show that the damage to
property was the direct, natural, and/or probable result of the
government's act.220 In other words, the claimant's harm must be
the predictable, necessary, inevitable consequence of the act.2 2 1
For instance, in Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States,222
the government diverted water into a lake at the same time as an
unusually heavy rainfall, and the lake then overflowed and
contaminated an irrigation source. 223 The Claims Court found that
the resulting damage to plaintiffs trees was not the "direct, natural,
or probable result of the [government's] action, but rather the
incidental and consequential result of the [government's] authorized
activity," and dismissed the takings claim. 2 24
As the Federal Circuit explained in Cary v. United States,225
"[t]aking a calculated risk, or even increasing a risk of a detrimental
result, does not equate to making the detrimental result direct,
natural, or probable." 226 There, claimants alleged a taking when a
wildfire that originated on a National Forest spread to adjacent
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact.").
219. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1372-73
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
220. Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bagwell
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 722, 725-26 (1990) (citing Columbia Basin Orchard
v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709 (Ct. Cl. 1955)); see also Ridge Line, Inc.
v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Barnes v. United
States, 538 F.2d 865, 871 (Ct. Cl. 1976); N. Ctys. Hydro-Elec. Co. v. United
States, 170 Ct. Cl. 241, 276 (1965). Although some of these courts expressed the
standard as "direct, natural, or probable," the holdings make it clear that
probability alone does not suffice. See, e.g., L.L. Richard v. United States, 282
F.2d 901, 904 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (requiring claimants to show that seepage upon
their land was "the natural and probable consequence of the [government's]
acts").
221. Moden, 404 F.3d at 1343 ("[P]laintiff must prove that the government
should have predicted or foreseen the resulting injury." (emphasis added)); see
also Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 15-16 (1933) (finding a taking
following failed negotiations for a flowage easement where the United States
"contemplated" flowage of farmland upon construction of a federal dam).
222. 132 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
223. Id. at 708.
224. Id. at 711; see also Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 147
(1924) (dismissing a takings claim absent proof that flooding was "the direct or
necessary result of the structure"); John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 138, 146 (1921) (dismissing a takings claim where the damage resulting
from the government's actions "could not have been foreseen or foretold");
Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562, 566 (1932) ("A taking .. . must have
been an intentional appropriation of the property to the public use.
225. 552 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
226. Id. at 1378.
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property. 227 The property damage was not the direct, natural, or
probable result of forest management policies when "there [was] no
concrete beginning, but merely a long sequence of decisions, some
risk-increasing but others risk-decreasing, spread out over
decades." 228 In the damaged area, wildfires are foreseeable-and
even "an unavoidable fact of life"-that "frequently and predictably
occur." 2 2 9 Although the fuel load had grown since the government
began a policy of fire suppression nearly a century earlier, it was not
enough to allege that a foreseeable risk of damage arose from the
accumulation. 230 Rather, the landowner must establish a "natural
progression of a chain of events" between fuel load accumulation and
damage to his property; absent such specificity-amounting to
substantial certainty-a takings claim must fail. 2 31 .
In teeing up the issue for remand in Arkansas Game & Fish, the
Supreme Court directed the lower court to consider whether the
inevitably recurring flood "[was] intended or [was] the foreseeable
result of authorized government action."2 3 2  As precedent, the
opinion cited John Horstmann Co. v. United States,2 33 where an
extraordinary nineteen-foot surge in lake levels occurred
immediately after the construction of a federal irrigation project. 234
Lake levels had not varied over two feet in the previous four
decades. 235  The project, which was located in an area having
extremely porous soils, transported water in unlined canals and
seepage from those canals percolated into the lake.236 Based on the
limited science available at the time, the government could not be
227. Id. at 1375.
228. Id. at 1379. In contrast, in cases where a taking has been found, the
sequence of events "operated like a Rube Goldberg machine, with a concrete
beginning (the dam), an ending (the flood), and in the middle, a series of steps
each inevitably following from the one before it." Id. (emphasis added) (citing
Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 234 (Ct. Cl. 1948)).
229. Id. at 1375.
230. Id. at 1375, 1380.
231. Id. at 1378-79. The Cary court also found that the wildfire had not
appropriated any benefit to the government; rather, the fire that destroyed the
plaintiffs property also destroyed the public interest that forest management
policies had sought to protect. Id. at 1380.
232. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519, 522
(2012) (citing John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921);
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re
Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 799 F.2d 317,
325-26 (7th Cir. 1986)). The United States argued that damage to downstream
property, however foreseeable, was not a taking because it was collateral or
incidental and was not aimed at any particular landowner, but the argument
was first raised at oral argument so the Court refused to address it. Id. at 521-
22.
233. 257 U.S. 138 (1921).
234. Id. at 143.
235. Id. at 142.
236. Id. at 143-44.
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charged with knowledge that water levels would rise to such an
extent that the plaintiffs mining operation would be destroyed.2 37
The claim was rejected: "it would border on the extreme to say that
the government intended a taking by that which no human
knowledge could even predict.... [That] could not have been
foreseen or foretold." 238
Foreseeability is the touchstone for a negligence claim arising in
tort. For a consequence to be foreseeable, it must be more than
merely probable; it must be both "probable and predictable," 239 or, as
some courts say, "natural and probable." 240 Thus, a consequence
that might have been anticipated may be deemed possible or
perhaps even probable, but it is not foreseeable unless it is the
predictable, natural, and probable consequence of the act. In other
words, to be liable for negligence, there must be a finding that the
person should have anticipated (predicted) that harm would result
as a probable consequence of the act.2 4 1
The classic formulation of negligence is derived from Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing24 2 : one is liable if
one fails to undertake the burden of precaution when the burden is
less than the probability and severity of harm.243 According to the
237. See id. at 146 (stating that, given the "obscurity in the movement of
percolating waters . . . there could not have been foresight of their destination
nor purpose to appropriate the properties").
238. Id.
239. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (stating that "[iut would be folly to impose liability for mere
possibilities"; rather, liability flows from acts "which are foreseeable in the
sense that they are probable and predictable" (emphasis added)); see also 2
JOHN TOOTHMAN & DOUGLAS DANNER, TRIAL PRACTICE CHECKLISTS § 9:243 (2d
ed. 2016) ("When we say that something is foreseeable, we mean that it is a
probable and predictable consequence of the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions." (emphasis added)).
240. See Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881) (stating that the
injury must have been the "natural and probable consequence" of the act); Fort
Smith Gas Co. v. Cloud, 75 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1935) (equating
foreseeability with "natural and probable consequences"); Hatch v. Globe
Laundry Co., 171 A. 387, 389 (Me. 1934) (noting that the "natural and probable
consequence" test provides a workable guide to resolving the vast majority of
proximate cause cases).
241. Compare Probable, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
"probable" as "[l]ikely to exist, be true, or happen"), and Probable Consequence,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "probable consequence" as
"[an effect or result that is more likely than not to follow its supposed cause"),
with Foreseeability, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
"foreseeability" as "reasonably anticipatable ... an element of proximate cause
in tort law"), and Proximate Consequence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (defining "proximate consequence" as a "result following an unbroken
sequence from some event, esp. one resulting from negligence").
242. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
243. Id. at 173; see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122 (2d
ed. 1977) (discussing Carroll Towing); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
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Restatement (Third) of Torts, "Primary factors to consider in
ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are
the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the
burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm."2 4 4
Foreseeability turns in part-but only in part-on probability.245 As
such, a test that turns solely on probability of harm does not even
rise to the level of foreseeability for purposes of tort liability for
negligence, and it falls far short of liability for purposes of a taking.
In cases that allege a temporary taking, the trick is ensuring
that intent is not "inferred based on simple causation alone." 2 4 6
Where actual intent cannot be shown, using the substantial
certainty test to differentiate takings from torts can help address
this problem.
Substantial certainty, according to pattern jury instructions,
means "virtually sure" or "inevitable," i.e., "almost no chance that
the harmful consequences would not occur." 2 4 7 When a defendant
acts despite appreciation of a foreseeable risk of harm, its conduct is
negligent, but when the probability of particular consequences
increases to the point of actual or substantial certainty, the
defendant is treated as if it had in fact desired to produce the
result. 248
The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the following example
of an intentional tort:
A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A
knows that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (explaining the classic B<PL formula
for negligence); Basil A. Umari, Note, Is Tort Law Indifferent to Moral Luck?, 78
TEX. L. REV. 467, 489 (1999) ("[F]oreseeability and probability are not
synonymous.").
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
245. Id.
246. Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 328 P.3d 1261, 1271 (Or. 2014).
247. 18 H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 14:3 (3d ed. 2016).
248. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883-84 (Fla.
1986); Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ohio 1991); see Wallace v.
Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he mere knowledge and
appreciation of a risk-something short of substantial certainty-is not
intent."); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) ("Intentional
torts . . . 'as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts[,] . . . generally
require that the actor intend "the consequences" of an act,' not simply 'the act
itself."' (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998))); Spivey v.
Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972) (finding no intent where a hug had
the "bizarre" result of paralysis).
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desire to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially
certain to do so. 2 4 9
A did not set out to harm C; A did not act with any purpose or
design toward C whatsoever. Yet C's injury is the direct, natural,
and probable-even inevitable-result of A's act. A acted with
substantial certainty of the consequence to C.
As the drafters of the Third Restatement further clarified: "The
applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial
certainty that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular
victim, or to someone within a small class of potential victims within
a localized area."250 C qualifies as the particular victim, and if C
was among a pool of stenographers, that pool would qualify as the
small class of potential victims.
By way of contrast, the Seventh Circuit highlighted examples
where, over time, some harm to someone may be anticipated, but
substantial certainty of direct harm to the plaintiff is lacking:
"Suppose agents of the FBI, while chasing a kidnapper, demolish
someone's car, or suppose a postal van runs over a child's tricycle.
Do these accidents "take" the car and tricycle? Certainly they are
casualties of the operation of government. . . . [But they are] not
takings."251
Neither the FBI agents nor the postal van driver is
substantially certain of a direct consequence to the car or the
tricycle. That the destruction was caused by the FBI agents and, in
the second case, the van driver is undeniable, but both the car and
the tricycle are, in effect, collateral damage. The government may
be liable for negligence, but not for a constitutional taking.
To summarize, a taking can only occur in a case of temporary
physical occupation when the government acts with the purpose of
occupying the property or with a substantial certainty that the
occupation of the property will occur. Absent purpose or substantial
certainty of direct harm to a particular claimant or discrete class of
claimants, damage that results from risk-taking, even intentional or
reckless risk-taking, comes within negligence rules-as a tort.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §1 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). This would exclude a
landowner engaged in the construction of a high-rise building during which a
number of workers will be injured in the course of construction, a railroad
whose operations will result in a number of injuries to unidentifiable persons at
unknown times in the future, and a knife manufacturer where persons using its
knives will inadvertently cut themselves at some point in time. Id.
251. In re Chi., Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 799
F.2d 317, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1986).
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When courts require proof that the invasion of the claimant's
land was the direct, natural, and probable result of the
government's act, the substantial certainty test is met.252 However,
when courts apply that phrase in the disjunctive-seeking only a
direct, natural, or probable result-takings liability may be imposed
for attenuated results that may have been foreseeable (if even that),
but not substantially certain or intentional. 253
The Claims Court opinion in Hansen demonstrates this
problem. 254 Hansen allowed takings claims to proceed in a case that
looked remarkably like a tort, and should have been treated as one.
In Hansen, plaintiffs groundwater wells were contaminated due to
the mishandling of a pesticide that the Forest Service had used,
stored, and dumped on neighboring land some twenty years prior to
the lawsuit.255 The court found a causal link between the dumping
and the well contamination through seepage of the pesticide when it
was spilled or poured onto the ground and then moved down the
gradient to plaintiffs wells. 256 There was no evidence that the
Forest Service had actual or constructive knowledge of either the
migratory nature of the pesticide or the underlying hydrogeology at
the time of the events.257 The causal link in Hansen may have been
sufficient for cause-in-fact but it does not appear to have been
sufficient for proximate cause, as needed for a negligence claim,
252. See L.L. Richard v. United States, 282 F.2d 901, 904 (Ct. Cl. 1960)
(requiring that the occupation be "the natural and probable consequence");
Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 234 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (requiring
that flooding be the "actual and natural consequence"); cf. Dunn v. City of
Milwaukie, 328 P.3d 1261, 1274 (Or. 2014) (applying substantial certainty test
in finding that damage caused by sewage backing up into plaintiffs bathroom
when city used pressurized water to clean adjacent sewer lines was not
"necessary, certain, predictable, or inevitable," and thus was not a taking).
253. See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 97-98 (2005).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 81. Employees reportedly buried several pesticide cans on Forest
Service land near plaintiffs property in the mid-1970s. By the time the
plaintiff purchased the property in 1998, contamination had been detected, but
apparently neither the seller nor the plaintiff became aware of it until a year or
two later. Id.
256. Id. at 121.
257. Id. According to the Hansen court, the plaintiff produced sufficient
evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether contamination "constitute[d] a
permanent and substantial invasion that was the direct, natural, or probable
consequence of intentional and authorized government actions." Id. at 120. But
see John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 133, 146-47 (1921) (finding
no intentional invasion of floodwater in light of "obscurity in the movement of
percolating waters" at the time). Of course, if there were a permanent invasion,
the per se test of Loretto Teleprompter would apply, not the balancing test
applicable to temporary invasions. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 n.12 (1982).
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much less for the direct, natural, and probable causal connection
needed for a takings claim. 2 5 8
In the Missouri River flood case, the test cannot be met unless
the myriad plaintiffs, many of whom are situated hundreds of miles
downstream from the allegedly mismanaged dams, show that the
Corps acted with substantial certainty that their particular
properties would be inundated by inevitably recurring floodwaters
in excess of pre-dam flood conditions. 259 If instead, as in National
By-Products, flooding is "the result of a particular 'concatenation of
physical conditions,' 2 6 0 there is no taking.
On the other hand, the test would likely be met in a case like
Arkansas Game & Fish, where the Corps was on notice that the
State's property would be damaged if the Corps persisted in
operating its dam in a way that kept farm fields dry for longer
periods. 261 Another example is St. Bernard Parish Government v.
United States,262 where plaintiffs raised takings claims against the
Corps for constructing and operating a seventy-six-mile-long
navigational channel, known as the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet
("MRGO"). 263 The MRGO significantly increased storm surge and
caused flooding on their properties during Hurricane Katrina in
2005, as well as "inevitably recurring" flooding during Hurricane
Rita that same month and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008.264
The record showed that the Corps was aware of "significant
ecological changes in the St. Bernard region almost immediately
after construction of the MRGO began" in the 1950s. 2 65 In prior
tort-based cases, the courts found that MRGO allowed Hurricane
Katrina to generate a storm surge capable of breaching levees and
258. See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 106, 121-22 (finding that the plaintiff had
met the causation requirement and that the "causation requirement ... simply
requires proof that the government is the cause-in-fact of the harm for a taking
to occur").
259. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (describing the Ideker
Farm litigation).
260. Nat'l By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1274 (Ct. Cl.
1969); supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text; see Sanguinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (dismissing a takings claim where the
parcel had been subject to overflows prior to construction of the canal); ARK-
MO Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384, 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (dismissing
claim for flood-related crop damage absent proof that the closing of a dam
caused greater flooding than pre-dam conditions).
261. See supra notes 124-51 and accompanying text (describing the
Arkansas Game & Fish litigation).
262. 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).
263. Id. at 690-91.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 719. By 2004, the Corps had no choice "but to recognize that a
hurricane inevitably would provide the meteorological conditions to trigger the
ticking time bomb created by a substantially expanded and eroded [MRGO] and
the resulting destruction of wetlands that had shielded the St. Bernard Polder
for centuries." Id. at 747.
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flooding St. Bernard, but ultimately found the Corps immune from
tort claims under the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 2 66 The Saint Bernard Parish court found a taking
because the Corps had knowledge that MRGO would increase
salinity, wetland loss, and erosion that would, in turn, exacerbate
MRGO's funnel effect and make MRGO into a hurricane
superhighway that intensified surges hitting St. Bernard and
flooding the plaintiffs' properties. 267 In a subsequent opinion, the
court determined that a class action would be appropriate for "at
least" thirty thousand affected property owners.268
Why impose such a high threshold on takings claimants?
Returning to the fundamental premise of the Fifth Amendment:
"The idea that the sovereign's power of eminent domain could be
exercised through error, accident, or inadvertence, is at odds with
the nature of the power itself." 269 The underlying principles and
purposes of the Takings Clause suggest that takings liability for
temporary occupations should only flow from a purposeful act
undertaken to accomplish a public purpose. 270
IV. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
If a claim qualifies as a taking rather than a tort, the claim may
only succeed if the claimant possessed a legally protected property
right that was appropriated by government action undertaken for a
public use.271  Owners of inherently vulnerable floodplain and
coastal land possess inherently limited property rights in several
respects. First, the background principles of property law include
water law, which is an essential component of the riparian estate,
266. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 454 (5th Cir. 2012).
267. Saint Bernard Par. Gov't v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707, 720 (2016).
Although the Claims Court required only that the result (flooding of the
property) be the "foreseeable result of government action," the facts of the Saint
Bernard case would likely support a takings claim under the higher threshold of
substantial certainty. Id. (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012)).
268. Saint Bernard Par., 126 Fed. Cl. at 734.
269. Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 328 P.3d 1261, 1270 (2014).
270. See supra notes 61-62, 187-90.
271. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (noting that whether there was a taking depended first on whether the
loss could be analyzed as a taking as opposed to a tort and, second, on whether
a landowner had a protectable property interest in avoiding flooding from runoff
under state law); Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 243, 246-47
(2010) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (holding
that plaintiffs could not seek compensation for an alleged taking of asserted
rights to "fish, swim, bathe, view wildlife or operate a boat" and stating that
plaintiffs may only assert takings claims if they have property rights).
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providing both benefits to and limitations on the owner. 272 The law
of water rights of any given jurisdiction is fundamentally
intertwined with the owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Further, where the land use in question is a common
law nuisance or offends the public trust doctrine, a government may
adversely affect the use without liability for a taking. 273 Finally,
where the government confers at least as much benefit as it does
loss, i.e., where the claimant has experienced givings rather than
takings, there is no right to Fifth Amendment compensation. 2 7 4
A. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
Background principles of property law may have made all the
difference in the Arkansas Game & Fish case. Under Arkansas law,
the Commission had no legally protected entitlement to unaltered
river flows, given the correlative nature of riparian water law,
where each riparian owner may use water or modify flows to serve
their reasonable needs.275 Riparian rights are inherently flexible
and inherently uncertain. 276 The Commission could not have had a
reasonable investment-backed expectation to be free of changed
inundation patterns. 277 The Court recognized the relevance of this
issue to the disposition of the takings claim, but the issue had been
waived because the United States failed to contest whether a
riparian landowner had a property right not to be inundated under
state law.2 7 8
272. See T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Origin of the Riparian Doctrine, 28
Mo. L. REV. 60, 60 (1963) (discussing the common law origin of the riparian
estate).
273. Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in
a Pod?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2012).
274. The doctrine of public necessity, which absolves a government of
liability for the destruction of private property to prevent grave threats to life or
property of others, may also serve as an inherent limitation on riparian and
coastal landowners' interests. See Irwin v. City of Minot, 860 N.W.2d 849, 852
(N.D. 2015) (citing TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2013)); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity
Defenses to Taking Liability for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 420 (2011); Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The
Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 127 (2013); Brian Angelo
Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 392 (2015).
275. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 10 (citing Harris v. Brooks, 283
S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955)).
276. Jennifer S. Graham, Comment, The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface
Water Law, 57 Mo. L. REV. 223, 237 (1992).
277. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); see Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (noting that, under West Virginia's rule of reasonable use, landowners
dealing with drainage are entitled to take steps as are reasonable "in light of all
the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor and disadvantage to the
adjoining landowners, as well as social utility").
278. Ark. Game & Fish, 736 F.3d at 1375.
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The Supreme Court has dismissed takings claims in numerous
cases where government action caused significant economic harm
but did not interfere with interests "sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for
Fifth Amendment purposes." 279 In Penn Central, the Supreme
Court found that New York City's landmark preservation law did
not interfere with reasonable expectations where Penn Central
could continue to use Grand Central Station just as it had in the
past, as a railroad terminal with office space and commercial
concessions, despite its designation as a landmark. 280 Although
Penn Central was unable to construct a fifty-story office building
above the station, New York had not interfered with the "distinct,"
"primary expectation" for the use of the parcel, and Penn Central
was still able to obtain a "reasonable return" on its investment.281
This prong of the takings analysis quickly became known as the
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" test, 282 which turns on
objectively reasonable expectations in the use of the property. 283 As
Justice Kennedy remarked in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,28 4 "The expectations protected by the Constitution are
279. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)
(citing United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)) (no
property interest in high-water level to maintain power head); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73-75 (1913) (no property
interest in navigable waters); see Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
321 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1944); Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544,
570 (1905).
280. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
281. Id. The Court cited Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), for
the principle that destruction of only "distinct" investment-backed expectations
could result in a taking. Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 124, 127 (citing Mahon, 260
U.S. at 413).
282. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 125 (noting that the Court had rejected takings claims when the
government action "did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property').
283. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
499 (1987) (finding no taking where only about 75% of the claimant's coal could
be profitably mined even without regulatory restrictions, and where "reasonable
'investment-backed expectations' were not materially affected by a regulatory
duty to retain a small percentage for surface support); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (explaining that a "unilateral expectation or
an abstract need" does not constitute a reasonable investment-backed
expectation); see also Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations. Should Notice of Rising Seas Lead to Falling Expectations for
Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 239, 246 (2011)
(tracing the evolution of the principle).
284. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as
reasonable by all parties involved." 285
One facet of this prong of the takings inquiry is the notice rule:
owners who acquired property with actual or constructive
knowledge of an existing restriction or limitation-such as
flooding-may not have had reasonable expectations of unfettered
development. 286 Yet notice of an existing restriction at the time of
purchase does not automatically bar a takings claim; it is simply one
important factor to weigh in the balance. 287
In St. Bernard Parish, the Claims Court acknowledged that a
property owner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations" must
include knowledge of prior flooding. 288 However, the court found
that, while plaintiffs' properties were in a floodplain and "had
experienced flooding in the past," the experience was not
"comparable" to the flooding during Hurricane Katrina and
subsequent storms, where the government's MRGO navigational
channel significantly increased storm surge and directed it onto the
properties. 289 Absent MRGO, properties within the levee system
had been protected from flooding, giving rise to "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" concerning the use and value of
the plaintiffs' land, residences, and businesses. 290 Thus, the court
found that the St. Bernard plaintiffs met the Arkansas Game & Fish
factors: (1) a legally protected property interest; (2) reasonable
investment-backed expectations given the character of the land; (3)
foreseeability; (4) causation; and (5) substantial damages.291
Returning to Arkansas Game & Fish, it seems fair to ask the
following: if the risk of serious flooding was sufficiently foreseeable
for the government to construct a flood control dam, why was that
risk not sufficiently foreseeable to landowners downstream from the
dam, such that the reasonableness of an expectation in avoiding
285. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-
Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REV. 891,
893-94 (2002).
287. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. ("[Some] enactments are unreasonable and
do not become less so through passage of time or title."). As Justice O'Connor
explained in her concurrence, "the regulatory regime in place at the time the
claimant acquires the property at issue helps shape the reasonableness of those
expectations." Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S.
at 315 n.11 (rejecting a claim where plaintiffs purchased the land "amidst a
heavily regulated zoning scheme," when "almost everyone ... knew ... that a
crackdown on development was in the works").
288. 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 719 (2015) (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012)).
289. Id. at 720.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 719. As noted above, the character of the government action is an
essential factor as well, but that factor was neglected in Arkansas Game & Fish,
133 S. Ct. at 521-22.
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floods would be called into question? And if changes in the
operation of the dam would inevitably alter the inundation patterns
downstream, would that fact undermine the reasonableness of the
Commission's expectation in avoiding flooding? 292  Given the
government's narrow litigation strategy, which rested on the notion
that temporary flooding could not constitute a taking, the
reasonableness of the Commission's expectations in its floodplain
property was not preserved for appeal. 293
In addition to historic inundations, reasonable investment-
backed expectations should include the likelihood of future changes
in physical conditions and in infrastructure operations. In
particular, climate change may affect the reasonableness of an
owner's expectations with regard to water rights and riparian or
coastal parcels. 294 As Professor Echeverria observed, "the already
apparent and predicted future effects of climate change should
arguably bar virtually any water right holder from claiming an
investment-backed expectation to exploit a water right free from
climate-related regulatory controls."295  Echeverria's supposition
applies equally to riparian and coastal land. According to Justice
Kennedy, "Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a
fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its
development and use than the common law of nuisance might
otherwise permit." 296
B. The Nature of Vulnerable Properties
In Lucas, the Supreme Court recognized public nuisance as a
preclusive defense to takings claims. 297 A public nuisance is the
substantial and unreasonable use of property in a way that
adversely affects a community or a considerable number of
persons. 298  The act must be injurious to health, indecent, or
offensive, and it must unreasonably interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property.299
292. John Echeverria, Ruling in MR-GO Takings Lawsuit, TAKINGS LITIG.
(May 2, 2015), http://takingslitigation.com/2015/05/02/ruling-in-mr-go-takings
-lawsuit/.
293. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 521-22.
294. See AECOM, supra note 16, at 2-10 (describing effects of climate
change).
295. John D. Echeverria, The Intersection of Water Law and
Takings Doctrine, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., 2014, at 8B-1,
8B-22, http://www-assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/directories/FacultyDocuments
/EcheverriaIntersectionWaterLawAndTakings.pdf.
296. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
297. Id. at 1029.
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
299. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 446 (R.I. 2008).
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When the use of land is a public nuisance, a takings claim
against a government that prohibits or otherwise adversely affects
that land use is negated because "no one has a legally protected
right to use property in a manner that is injurious to the safety of
the general public."300 This theme harkens back to the nineteenth
century, when the Court denied a takings claim brought by a
brewery where state law treated breweries as nuisances. 30 1
In Hendler v. United States,302 a federal agency's entry onto
land to install groundwater monitoring wells and to conduct
activities related to a cleanup of toxic chemicals was a nuisance
abatement effort not subject to compensation. 3 0 3 Similarly, in John
R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,304 the court applied the
nuisance exception in finding that government occupation to
remediate a landfill was not a taking, 305 and in Hillsboro Partners,
LLC v. Fayetteville,306 a landowner was not entitled to compensation
for the demolition of a building that posed a safety hazard. 307 By
contrast, in Placer Mining Co. v. United States,308 the court held
that government occupation for remediation of a mine did not come
within the nuisance exception, where the claimant did not challenge
the remediation work itself but alleged that a government-
constructed channel and bridge, distinct from the remediation work,
had effectively denied its access to the mine. 309
Flood control "involves th[e] highest of public interests-the
prevention of death and injury."310 Land use development that
300. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); see Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 149, 183 (2000) ("[A] substantial majority of the
courts . . . consider restrictions derived from legislation and administrative
regulation, as well as from common law doctrines such as nuisance law, in order
to ascertain what use restrictions 'inhere in the title . . . .'); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-62 (1964).
301. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887); see Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-89 (1987) (citing Mugler, 123
U.S. at 657).
302. 36 Fed. Cl. 574 (1996), aff'd, 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
303. Id. at 586.
304. 60 Fed. Cl. 230 (2004), rev'd on other grounds, 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
305. Id. at 251.
306. 738 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. App. 2013).
307. Id. at 827; see Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305
(1997) (applying the nuisance exception where a city removed seawalls and
patios encroaching on a beach and obstructing public access); cf. Seiber v.
United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (seeming to recognize a
nuisance exception to a physical takings claim in upholding a logging restriction
that interfered with the owner's right to exclude spotted owls).
308. 98 Fed. Cl. 681 (2011).
309. Id. at 685-86.
310. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 210
Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1370 (1989).
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undermines or prevents the accomplishment of that public interest
may be considered a public nuisance and abated by a government
without takings liability. However, due to the narrow litigation
strategy adopted by the United States in Arkansas Game & Fish,
the nuisance exception was not briefed.311 Even if it had been, it
may not have gained traction in that case because there is no
indication that maintaining a hardwood forest and wildlife refuge in
a riparian area would be considered an unreasonable use of property
that adversely affects the community. To the contrary, such uses
would likely provide filtration, drainage, and other ecological
benefits.
If a particular land use does not amount to a public nuisance,
an evolving concept of the public trust may serve as an inherent
limitation on property ownership of vulnerable riparian and coastal
parcels. 312 Under the public trust doctrine, tidal and navigable
waters and the lands beneath them belong to the people and must
be administered by the state for their benefit. 3 1 3 In Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, 3 14 the Supreme Court held that a state
legislature could rescind its earlier conveyance of a lake bed without
liability for a taking because the state lacked authority to make
such a conveyance in the first place: "The State can no more
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . .. than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace." 3 15 Moreover, federal courts have
the authority-as well as the responsibility-to apply the doctrine
as a background principle of property law. 3 16
At minimum, the doctrine prohibits alienation of trust
properties to private entities that would block public access to trust
311. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 10.
312. See John Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 933 (2012)
(applying the public trust doctrine as a defense to takings claims by water
rights holders aggrieved by regulatory restrictions designed to protect fish and
other trust resources); Lin, supra note 273, at 1097; Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 155 (1971) (observing that
"the idea that public rights can prevail over private property rights appears in
the law only sporadically, as in navigation servitude, public nuisance and the
public trust doctrines").
313. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine - A Twenty-First
Century Concept, 16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 105, 105-07 (2010);
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 707-08 (2006); Joseph L.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
314. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
315. Id. at 453.
316. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 456
(2011), aff'd, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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resources. 3 17 Access has traditionally included rights to fish and to
navigate, but some courts have also recognized public rights to
recreational uses and to ecological values. 318 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed, "The public trust doctrine, like all common
law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should
be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of
the public it was created to benefit." 319
The public trust doctrine has provided a viable defense to
takings claims by private landowners of riparian and coastal parcels
in several cases,320 but it has been rejected in a few cases where the
government or an intervening party attempted to apply it to other
types of property, such as vested water rights. 321 As an evolving
317. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 455-56.
318. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95-96
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (recognizing public rights to Redwood National Park);
Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Board, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska
1988) (recognizing public rights to "fish, wildlife and water resources"); Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing
public rights to "the scenic views of [Mono] lake and its shore, the purity of the
air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds"); In re Water Use
Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing public rights to
"ground water, surface water and all other water"); Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (recognizing public
rights to recreational use); In re Ellington Constr. Corp., 549 N.Y.S.2d 405,
413-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (recognizing public rights to parkland); see also
Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1010 (Haw. 2006) (recognizing
that trustee's discretion is circumscribed by the doctrine). For arguments that
the doctrine protects "a viable climate system," see Juliana v. United States,
No. 6:15-CV-1517-TC, 2016 WL 1442435, at *26-27 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016)
(denying government's motion to dismiss atmospheric trust and related claims)
and Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation:
Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45
ENVTL. L. 259, 259, 289-97 (2015).
319. Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54; see Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic
Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (expanding the
doctrine to drinking water as "an essential commodity which all of nature
requires for survival"); see also Nat'l Audubon Soc', 658 P.2d at 721 (applying
trust to Mono Lake and non-navigable tributaries); Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1011
(broadly construing trust provisions of Hawaii's constitution).
320. See Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1109-10 (La. 2004) (interfering
with oyster beds to address erosion concerns not a taking); W.J.F. Realty Corp.
v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008, 1011 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (restricting
development in a natural area of Long Island not a taking); McQueen v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20 (S.C. 2003) (denying permit to fill
tidelands not a taking); Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis.
1972) (prohibiting shoreland landowners from filling wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters not a taking).
321. See Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 461 (rejecting defense because state law
permitted diversions despite harm to trust resources); Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 316, 322-23 (2001) (rejecting
defense where government restricted deliveries to protect endangered fish); cf.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding a taking when developers were prevented from filling wetlands).
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doctrine, the contours of the public trust defense to taking claims
remain unclear. However, with respect to temporary physical
occupations of parcels on navigable waterways and tidelands, which
are situated at the geographic core of the public trust doctrine, the
doctrine's relevance to the takings inquiry is unmistakable.
C. Reciprocity of Advantage and Givings
To effectuate the purpose of barring governments from forcing
just one or a few owners to bear burdens "[that] should be borne by
the public as a whole," 32 2 Courts look for "an average reciprocity of
advantage" in determining whether government has gone "too far"
in adversely impacting private property. 323 There is no taking if the
action applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby
"secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage." 324 As the Supreme
Court explained in Penn Central:
The Fifth Amendment "prevents the public from loading upon
one individual more than his just share of the burdens of
government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from
other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be
returned to him."325
The "average reciprocity of advantage" inquiry goes hand in
hand with "givings" as an element of a takings claim. 32 6 Takings are
unconstitutional only when they are uncompensated. 32 7  If the
claimant suffered no net loss because the government action or
program in question conferred equally as much (or more) benefit as
it did loss, there is no taking. 328 Any amount due as compensation
322. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
323. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
324. See id. (using government drainage projects as an example of "average
reciprocity of advantage" between the owner of the restricted property and the
community).
325. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147-48
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)).
326. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547,
555-56 (2001); see also Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public
Acquisition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
295, 359-60 (2003).
327. John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of
Agriculture: Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign
Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REv. 657, 680 (2016).
328. Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that, when the government takes part of a crop in reserve,
the enhanced price of the remainder "matters"); Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (rejecting claim where plaintiff suffered no net
loss); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) ("[W]hen part only of a parcel of
236 [Vol. 52
TAKINGS AND TORTS
"[has] to be discounted, if not erased, to take account of any
offsetting benefits." 329
Flood-related cases serve as a quintessential example of givings
that will offset or defeat a takings claim. In United States v.
Sponenbarger,330 the Supreme Court explained,
[A] broad flood control program does not involve a taking
merely because it will result in an increase in the volume or
velocity of otherwise inevitably destructive floods, where the
program measured in its entirety greatly reduces the general
flood hazards, and actually is beneficial to a particular tract of
land.33 1
Where a government program inflicts some damage on the
claimant's land but confers great benefits overall, to provide
additional compensation to the claimant would be a windfall. 332
This principle was applied to deny a taking in John B. Hardwicke
Co. v. United States,33 3 when a second government dam increased
the incidence and severity of flooding that would have occurred if
only the first dam had been built, but the project in its entirety
made the expectation of flooding "far less than it would have been if
there had been no flood control program at all."334
This is not to say that a taking can never occur when the
benefits associated with a broad flood control program outweigh its
costs. The takings analysis considers only those benefits inuring
specifically to the takings claimant, not to the community at
large. 335  The relevant inquiry focuses on the "particularized
land is taken for a highway . .. the incidental injury or benefit to the part not
taken is also to be considered.").
329. Echeverria & Blumm, supra note 327, at 682; see Horne, 135 S. Ct. at
2432, 2434 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that compensation is calculated by
subtracting offsetting benefits conferred by the action that caused a taking, e.g.,
when part of a parcel is taken as a right-of-way, the amount due must be
reduced by the increased value of the remaining parcel due to the enhanced
road access).
330. 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
331. Id. at 266.
332. Id. at 266-67; see Bartz v. United States, 633 F.2d 571, 578 (1980) (the
government is not "an insurer against all damages from floods which may be
incidental to [flood-control] projects [that confer] benefits far outweighing
detriments").
333. 467 F.2d 488 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
334. Id. at 489-90.
335. City of Van Buren v. United States, 697 F.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir.
1983); United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1967); Aaronson v.
United States, 79 F.2d 139, 139-41 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Quebedeaux v. United
States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317, 323 (2013); see Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at
31 (arguing that the "average reciprocity of advantage" precludes recovery
where downstream damage is caused by releases from a flood control dam
because "[a]ll of the parcels greatly benefit from the first level of triage-the
presence of the dam and its operations prevent or mitigate disastrous flooding").
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benefits" received by the claimant. 336
This test has been applied outside of the flood context as well.
In Hendler, a takings claim was denied when the government
installed monitoring wells that benefitted property owners by
eliminating the need for them to conduct independent analyses of
their property, where the value of the benefit outweighed any lost
value due to the occupation. 337
Like other aspects of the property interest at issue, the need to
offset benefits bestowed on the landowner was never vetted in the
Arkansas Game & Fish litigation. The Corps belatedly tried to raise
this argument on remand, but it was precluded. 338
Circling back to the Missouri/Mississippi River flood of 2011,
many of the affected floodplain owners have received a bounty of
benefits from the United States through the years. Extensive, direct
benefits have been provided by government-constructed
and -maintained flood-control structures, in particular, the
upstream dams and reservoirs that were allegedly mismanaged in
2011.339 In addition, government channelization all along the lower
river to deepen and straighten the river's banks, so that water flows
more quickly downstream to the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico,
has provided flood-control benefits to many of the claimants'
properties by directing excess water away from them. 340 Other
structures that have provided particularized benefits-at least to
some of the properties-include in-stream wing dams, riprap, dikes,
revetments, and other forms of armoring all along the rivers to keep
the floodplain as dry as possible. 341
More directly, many of the affected landowners received
subsidized flood insurance and crop insurance, as well as other
forms of after-the-fact disaster relief. 342 The public cost for the 2011
336. Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 322-23; see Laughlin v. United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 85, 111-12 (1990), aff'd, 975 F.2d 869 (1992) (rejecting claim where
floodplain agriculture could not have existed at all without dams that released
higher volumes during heavy runoff); ARK-MO Farms, Inc. v. United States,
530 F.2d 1384, 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (rejecting claim where a multipurpose
navigation system generally alleviated flooding).
337. Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The nuisance-prevention aspect of Hendler is assessed above at supra note 303.
338. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
339. Complaint, supra note 3, at 6-7.
340. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 42, at Il-1, 11-4, 11-16.
341. See John H. Davidson, Multiple-Use Water Resources Development
Versus Natural River Functions: Can the WSRA and WRDA Coexist on the
Missouri River?, 83 NEB. L. REV. 362, 392 (2004) (describing bank stabilization
projects).
342. Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories:
Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1495-96
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flood fight and mitigation exceeded $1.4 billion, according to a
Department of Emergency Services report.343 Approximately $230
billion in flood-related damages were prevented that year by the
federal infrastructure on the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. 344 As
Abrams notes, "even the 'losers' remain beneficiaries of the dam's
presence because all persons and landowners downstream benefit
from safety increases and the reduction of calamitous risks that the
dam provides."345
Over the years, other types of benefits have been provided to the
claimants as well. Although these benefits are less likely to be
considered "particularized" under Sponenbarger, they nevertheless
are important equitable factors. Throughout the twentieth century,
the government provided assistance with subsidies and other
measures to promote agriculture and urban development in the
floodplain, and to protect vulnerable floodplain land by constructing
levees, terraces, and other devices to hold water and protect against
soil erosion.3 46 Whether or not decades-old conservation programs
are subtracted from the bottom line as "particularized benefits" to
claimants whose property is impacted by flooding, it is apparent
that there have been significant "givings" to the affected parcels that
need to be taken into account in any takings claim. 347
CONCLUSION
Determining which type of claim is being invoked-common law
tort or constitutional taking-may be clarified considerably, and the
nature of government action affecting floodplain and coastal
properties may be illuminated, with a test that differentiates
between purposeful appropriations for public benefit, undertaken
with intent or substantial certainty of the consequence, and
government actions involving some risk of a potentially foreseeable,
yet diffuse, impact. Viewed through this lens, claims such as those
brought by the landowners affected by the 2011 Missouri/Mississippi
flood should be treated as torts, while claims such as those brought
by Gulf Coast residents inevitably flooded by the MRGO
(2007); see supra note 43 (noting that crop losses were partially offset by
insurance and other payments).
343. Bismarck Tribune, supra note 50 (quoting Jody Farhat of the Corps's
Missouri division).
344. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 42, at ES-VI, V-12, V-23, V-24.
Since inception, the system has prevented approximately $612 billion in flood
damages. Id.
345. Abrams & Bertelsen, supra note 9, at 21.
346. See Sandra Zellmer, Boom and Bust on the Great Plains: Dja Vu All
Over Again, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 385, 395-96 (2008) (describing soil
conservation programs) (book review).
347. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 326, at 551 (assessing ways to
account for "derivative givings," such as increased value of property due to
creation of adjacent green space).
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navigational canal should be treated as takings. More broadly, with
this clarification, officials at all institutional levels may be willing to
make more proactive decisions to operate their flood control
structures to better protect vulnerable areas and human and
ecological communities and to restrict or at least mitigate the effects
of unsustainable development.
If the jurisdictional threshold can be overcome for claims
sounding in takings rather than in torts, both the nature of the
government action and the dimensions of the claimant's property
interest will be at issue. The ability to develop vulnerable areas,
such as floodplain or coastal property, may be prohibited as an
inherent restriction under public nuisance, the public trust doctrine,
or other background principles of property law. In addition, many
floodplain and coastal landowners have received extensive benefits
through government flood control programs. If they have already
been compensated through government projects that, on balance,
provide them with more benefits than losses, there can be no viable
takings claim when the floodwaters exceed the capabilities of those
projects.
240 [Vol. 52
